Ash croft denies taking little interest in terrorism
Commission: FBI failed to connect warnings before attacks
Tuesday, April 13, 2004 Posted: 8:21 PM EDT (0021 GMT)
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Attorney General John Ashcroft testifies before the
9/11 commission on Tuesday.
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Wednesday, April 14:
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 VIDEO
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 John
Ashcroft denied accusations that he
wasn't interested in hearing about
terrorist threats before 9/11.
 Janet
Reno tells the 9/11 panel the FBI
"didn't know what it had."
 Louis
Freeh tells the panel that investigating
terrorists was the best his agency could
do.
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WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Attorney
General John Ashcroft defended himself Tuesday against
accusations that he showed little interest in terrorist
threats before the attacks of September 11, 2001, and he
blamed the Clinton administration for hobbling antiterrorism
efforts.
The FBI, meanwhile, came in for tough criticism from the
commission investigating the attacks, faulted in a staff
report for not piecing together "connections"
about terrorist activity.
The day's testimony featured key figures from the Bush
and Clinton administrations, who alternately blamed
inadequate resources, tight budgets, unreasonable
restrictions and disinterested superiors for why
antiterrorism efforts were not stronger before September 11.
(Gallery:
Quotes from the testimony)
Ashcroft appeared to criticize the Clinton administration
early on in his testimony.
"We did not know an attack was coming because for
nearly a decade our government had blinded itself to its
enemies," he said. "Our agents were isolated by
government-imposed walls, handcuffed by government-imposed
restrictions and starved for basic information
technology."
Ashcroft criticized his predecessors at the Justice
Department, saying a 1995 memorandum by then-Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick -- now a member of the commission --
hamstrung the FBI beyond what the law required.
But former acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard said
Ashcroft dismissed warnings of terrorist threats that summer
and rejected appeals for additional counterterrorism funds.
Pickard said that "in late June and through July, he
met with Attorney General Ashcroft once a week," the
report says. "He told us that though he initially
briefed the attorney general regarding these threats, after
two such briefings the attorney general told him he did not
want to hear this information anymore."
Ashcroft disputed Pickard's account when he appeared
before the commission, saying he met with him on more than
two occasions.
"Secondly, I did never speak to him saying that I
did not want to hear about terrorism," Ashcroft said.
Pickard also said that though President Bush had been
warned on August 6, 2001, in an intelligence memo that al
Qaeda was "determined" to strike U.S. targets,
neither Bush nor Ashcroft asked to meet with him between
then and the attacks.
But Pickard said he was unsure whether
"pulsing" the FBI -- shaking up field offices to
produce information about the threat -- would have turned up
those items in time to stop the plot.
FBI faulted
A staff report by the 9/11 commission says the agency
failed to connect terrorism warnings in 2001 with the
presence of al Qaeda operatives in the United States and
failed to locate two of the hijackers in the weeks before
the attacks of September 11, 2001.
"Despite recognition by the FBI of the growing
terrorist threat, it was still hobbled by significant
deficiencies," the commission concluded in staff
reports.
But former FBI Director Louis Freeh said the agency's
request for more agents and analysts were not fulfilled
before 9/11 and he said the country was not on a "war
footing" before the attacks.
"We were using grand jury subpoenas and arrest
warrants to fight an enemy that was using suicide boats to
attack our warships," he said, referring to the attack
on the Cole. The fight against terrorism at that time, he
said, was not "a real war."
The commission also heard from J. Cofer Black, the former
head of the CIA's counterterrorism center, who said that
intelligence reports in the summer of 2001 indicated a
"massive" terrorist strike was in the works.
"None of this, unfortunately, specified method, time
or place. Where we had clues, it looked like planning was
under way for an attack in the Middle East or Europe,"
he said.
'Profoundly sorry'
Black said he and his colleagues at the time "are
profoundly sorry. We did all we could. We did our
best." But he said the agency faced a shortage of money
and staff that "seriously hurt our operations and
analysis."
The commission reported Tuesday that an effort to locate
eventual 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar
in late August 2001 failed, hampered by disputes over how
widely agents could share information and a failure of
coordination.
Both men -- who flew American Airlines Flight 77 into the
Pentagon -- had been identified as attending a meeting of
terrorist suspects in Malaysia. They could have been held on
immigration charges or as material witnesses in the 2000
bombing of the destroyer USS Cole, the report found.
"Investigation or interrogation of these
individuals, and their travel and financial activities, also
may have yielded evidence of connections to other
participants in the 9/11 plot," the commission
concluded. "In any case, the opportunity did not arise.
"Notably, the lead did not draw any connections
between the threat reporting that had been coming in for
months and the presence of two possible al Qaeda operatives
in the United States," the report continued.
"Moreover, there is no evidence that the issue was
substantively discussed at any level above deputy chief of a
section within the Counterterrorism Division at FBI
headquarters."
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh says the country
was not on a "war footing" before
September 11, 2001.
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But Pickard testified that restrictions within the bureau
on sharing intelligence with criminal investigators
"hampered greatly" efforts to penetrate al Qaeda
cells. He said the hijackers were picked because their
background would raise no red flags among U.S. law
enforcement.
"These 19 acted flawlessly in their planning and
execution," he said. "They successfully exploited
every weakness, from our borders to our cockpit doors."
In addition, FBI counterterrorism chief Dale Watson
"told us that he almost fell out of his chair"
when Ashcroft outlined his budget priorities in May 2001,
because the list made no mention of counterterrorism, the
commission reported earlier Tuesday,
"The attorney general on May 10 issued budget
guidance for us, and I did not see that as a top item on the
agenda," Pickard said.
The Justice Department proposal did not include an
increase in counterterrorism funding over its pending
proposal for fiscal year 2002, and Pickard said Ashcroft
rejected his appeal for additional counterterrorism funds on
Sept. 10 -- a day before the al Qaeda attacks.
But Ashcroft said the Justice Department's budget
requests actually sought more money for counterterrorism.
Earlier, Ashcroft's predecessor, Janet Reno, testified
that she called on the FBI to improve its ability to share
information, both internally and with other agencies. She
said she did not know of any legal reason the FBI could not
share with other agencies information it had about Almihdhar
and Alhazmi.
Reno told the commission that she felt a "certain
amount of frustration" in early 2000 in trying to
improve the FBI's information-sharing capabilities.
Both Reno and Freeh said the agency had regular contact
with U.S. intelligence services and held frequent meetings
with former President Bill Clinton's national security
adviser, Samuel Berger.
Reno said she instituted the regular meetings because of
complaints that information was not being shared quickly and
efficiently. And Freeh said he recalled "extremely
close cooperation" between his agency and the CIA in
terrorist investigations.